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Abstract: When Hume, in the Treatise on Human Nature, began his examination of the 
relation of cause and effect, in particular, of the idea of necessary connection which is 
its essential constituent, he identified two preliminary questions that should guide his 
research: (1) For what reason we pronounce it necessary that every thing whose existence has a 
beginning should also have a cause and (2) Why we conclude that such particular causes must 
necessarily have such  particular effects? (1.3.2, 14-15) Hume observes that our belief in these 
principles can result neither from an intuitive grasp of their truth nor from a reasoning 
that could establish them by demonstrative means. In particular, with respect to the 
first, Hume examines and rejects some arguments with which Locke, Hobbes and 
Clarke tried to demonstrate it, and suggests, by exclusion, that the belief that we place 
on it can only come from experience. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Hume does not 
proceed to show how that derivation of experience could be made, but proposes 
instead to move directly to an examination of the second principle, saying that, 
“perhaps, be found in the end, that the same answer will serve for both questions” 
(1.3.3, 9). Hume's answer to the second question is well known, but the first question is 
never answered in the rest of the Treatise, and it is even doubtful that it could be, which 
would explain why Hume has simply chosen to remove any mention of it when he 
recompiled his theses on causation in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.  
Given this situation, an interesting question that naturally arises is to investigate 
the relations of logical or conceptual implication between these two principles. Hume 
seems to have thought that an answer to (2) would also be sufficient to provide an 
answer to (1). Henry Allison, in his turn, argued (in Custom and Reason in Hume, p. 94-97) 
that the two questions are logically independent. My proposal here is to try to show 
that there is indeed a logical dependency between them, but the implication is, rather, 
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from (1) to (2). If accepted, this result may be particularly interesting for an 
interpretation of the scope of the so-called “Kant's reply to Hume” in the Second 
Analogy of Experience, which is structured as a proof of the a priori character of (1), 
but whose implications for (2) remain controversial. 
Keywords: Hume. Causality. Regularity. Principle of uniformity. 
I Hume’s two causal principles and their logical relations  
At the beginning of Part 3 of Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume 
proposes to investigate the origin of the idea of causation, i.e., to 
identify the impression that it would copy. He identifies three 
components of the idea of cause and effect: spatiotemporal contiguity 
between cause and effect, temporal priority of the cause over the effect, 
and necessary connection between cause and effect (1.3.2, 7-11). 
Of these, the last one is the essential component. Since an 
examination of the objects themselves (events) as to their qualities and 
their relationship did not reveal any impression that could give rise to 
the idea of necessary connection, Hume proposes to address the 
problem indirectly from an examination of two questions:  
 (1) For what reason we pronounce it necessary that every thing whose existence has 
a beginning should also have a cause and (2) Why we conclude that such particular 
causes must necessarily have such  particular effects?  (1.3.2, 14-15)  
That is, Hume asks for the reasons of our belief in two maxims or 
principles:  
P1) Everything that begins to exist must have a cause of its existence. 
(1.3.3, 1)  
P2) Particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects. 
(1.3.3, 9)  
or, more fully:  
P2') The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same 
effect never arises but from the same cause. (Rule 4 of the “Rules by 
which to judge of causes and effects” (1.3.15, 6))  
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Hume observes that our belief in these principles can result 
neither from an intuitive grasp of its truth nor from a reasoning that 
could establish them by demonstrative means. In particular, with 
respect to the first, Hume examines and rejects some arguments with 
which Locke, Hobbes and Clarke tried to demonstrate it, and suggests, 
by exclusion, that the belief that we place on it can only come from 
experience. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Hume does not go on to 
show how this derivation of P1 from experience could be done, but 
proposes to move directly to the second proposition, saying that 
“maybe in the end, the same answer will serve to both questions” 
(1.3.3, 9). Hume's answer to the second question is well known, but the 
first question is never answered in the rest of the text of the Treatise, 
and it is even doubtful that it could be answered, a fact that would 
explain why Hume chose simply to suppress any mention of it when he 
recompiled his theses on causation in the Enquiry on Human 
Understanding.  
Given this situation, a question that naturally presents itself is 
to investigate the relations of logical or conceptual implication between 
these two propositions. Hume’s procedure suggests that he might have 
considered that there would be a relation of implication between P2 
and P1, so that, by providing an experimental justification for P2, he 
would ipso facto have justified P1, and this could very well be the reason 
why he never returned to examine this last principle. This interpretation 
was first proposed by Fred Wilson1 and his argument will be discussed 
in detail in the next part of my presentation.  
Henry Allison, in turn, argues that the two issues are logically 
independent2. He does not provide, however, a detailed argument for 
this claim, and merely says that “one can consistently maintain that 
every beginning of existence must have some cause while denying that 
any particular cause must have a particular effect, and vice versa.' (p.94). 
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That is, he proposed that P2 is consistent with ~P1 (with which I 
agree) and that P1 is consistent with ~P2 (with which I disagree, cf. the 
end of my presentation).  
The question that interests me, then, in this context is: Has 
Hume, as proposed by Wilson, established experimentally P1 albeit 
indirectly through the establishment of P2, or, as Allison suggests, there 
is no logical implication from P2 to P1, and therefore P1 receives no 
justification in Hume's empiricist system? This question is interesting 
for Hume scholars, but is particularly important for the discussion of 
so-called “Kant’s reply to Hume,” as influentially formulated by Lewis 
Beck3. In fact, Beck’s argument supposes:  
1) that Hume did not establish P1 (neither demonstratively nor by 
experience)  
2) that gaps in the series of impressions result in a violation of P2.  
3) that Hume employs P1 to “save” P2, although P1 is as much 
affected by the gaps as P2.  
4) that, therefore, Hume’s use of P1 is not legitimated within his 
system, which shows that he must have treated it as a priori valid (and 
this would be the “Prussian” element in Hume).  
Thus, authors who agree that the Second Analogy of 
Experience provides an answer to Hume, such as Allison and Beck, are 
understandably interested in denying that P1 is established within 
Hume’s system, and therefore cannot accept that P2 (which Hume does 
establish) somehow implies P1. On the other hand, authors like Wilson, 
who does not accept that Hume has committed the inconsistency of 
using an a priori principle in his explanation of causality, may find in the 
alleged implication of P2 to P1 a way to neutralize a crucial step in 
Beck’s argument.  
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It is not my intention here to investigate whether the Second 
Analogy, as interpreted by Beck, is an effective response to Hume4. 
Nor do I intend to decide whether P1 is, after all, experimentally 
established within Hume’s system. My goal is simply to examine the 
logical relations between P1 and P2; in particular, I wish to show, 
against Wilson, that P1 does not follow from P2, and, against Allison, 
that the reverse is true, i.e., that P2 is conceptually implied by P1. This 
latter result, if accepted, could be particularly interesting for an 
interpretation of the scope of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, 
which is articulated as a proof of the a priori character of P1, but whose 
implications as regards P2 remain controversial.  
II The implication P2 → P1  
Before turning to the arguments for the thesis I presented above, I will 
spend some time examining in detail (though I find it misleading) the 
argument presented by Fred Wilson for his proposal that P2 implies 
P1. Although his argument ultimately fails, this examination will allow 
me to introduce some important elements for the subsequent 
discussion.  
  Wilson deals with P2 in its stronger version, which appears in 
Rule 4 of section 15 quoted above: “The same cause always produces 
the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same 
cause.” This can best be presented with the aid of following diagram:  
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Figure 1 
The circles A and B here represent types or classes of events, and 
the points xi represent particular instances of their occurrence5. As 
these circles have a good portion of their surface in common, the 
situation is such that most occurrences of A coexist with occurrences 
of B, i.e., there is an approximate regularity in the conjunction of these 
two events. But by principle P2, we cannot say that in this situation A 
is the cause of B, since x1 represents a case in which A occurs and the 
supposed effect B does not occur, and x3 a case in which B occurs 
without the presence of the supposed cause A. In order that one could 
say that A is the cause of B, it would be necessary, according to 
principle P2, that there were an exact match between the two circles. In 
formal terms:  
(1) ( x ) ( Ax ≡ Bx )  
In his treatment of the problem, Wilson considers a case in 
which we have several hypotheses as to the supposed cause of a certain 
effect, and we must identify which of them is its real cause. For this, he 
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draws upon another Humean maxim expressed in Rule 5 of the section 
on Rules by which to judge of causes and effects. Hume says:  
There is another principle which hangs upon this [Rule 4], viz. that 
where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by 
means of some quality which we discover to be common amongst 
them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the 
causation to the circumstance wherein we discover the resemblance. 
(1.3.15, 7)  
Wilson’s argument is complex and involves aspects that can be 
disregarded for the purposes of this presentation. I will provide, then, a 
simplified version that preserves, as far as I understand, the core of his 
argument.  
  Suppose we have an effect B and two events A1 and A2 which 
may prima facie be considered its causes. B is represented by the whole 
circle and A1 and A2 are the two semicircles determined by the vertical 
line.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
In this case we have:  
(2) ( x ) ( A1 x ⊃ Bx )  
and also: 
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(3)     ( x ) ( A2 x ⊃ Bx )  
That is, every occurrence of either A1 or A2 are followed by 
occurrences of B, thus both A1 and A2 satisfy the first part of Rule 4 
(same causes produce same effects), but the second part of the rule is 
not satisfied, since the same effect B is conjugated to two different 
apparent causes, which, therefore, can neither be the real one. In this 
case, by Rule 5, we can anticipate that there will be another event A, 
which subsumes the common aspect of A1 and A2 and will be revealed 
as the true cause of B. Formally:  
(4)      (∃A ) ( x ) ( Ax ≡ Bx )  
 Or, in other words, for any strictly limited region of space and 
time x, there exists a determinate type of event A such that, if x 
contains a particular event of type B, then x also contains a particular 
event of type A, and vice-versa. 
As an intuitive model of the situation, consider a bulb that is lit 
(B) by the operation of any one of two parallel switches (A1 and A2). 
Then one cannot say that the pressing of any of the switches is, as such, 
the cause of the lightening of the lamp. The “true” cause, in the case, 
could be identified to the application of a voltage to the bulb poles.  
Formulas (2), (3) and (4) together affirm that, given a certain 
effect B for which a number of causes present themselves as 
candidates, there exists an event6 that will be its real cause, namely, 
whose occurrence constitutes a sufficient and necessary condition for the 
occurrence of that effect. In Wilson’s words, formula (4) (or, rather, the 
corresponding formula in his exposition) asserts that “for this effect B 
there is always a cause” (Wilson, p. 3-4, my italics). 
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Wilson then considers the result of a reversal in the position of 
the quantifiers in (4). This provides the formula:  
(5)  ( x ) (∃A ) ( Ax ≡ Bx )  
For Wilson, this formula also says that for B there is always a 
cause, but, unlike (4), does not say that this cause is the same in all 
cases. In his words, (5) states that “the effect always has a cause, but 
allows it to be a different cause on different occasions” (p. 4). Thus, in 
the example in Figure 2, B [the lightening of the lamp] always has a 
cause, but this is sometimes A1 [the pressing of the first switch], 
sometimes A2 [the pressing of the second switch].  
Wilson’s final step is to suggest that (4) provides the logical 
form7 of P2 and, correspondingly, that (5) provides the logical form of 
P1. As it is a quite elementary result in the predicate calculus that (4) 
logically implies (5), or that (5) follows from (4), Wilson believes to 
have shown that P1 follows logically from P2 and that Hume, when he 
established the latter, ipso facto established P1, and was therefore 
legitimately exempt from returning to the issue in the remainder of Part 
3 of Book 1 of the Treatise.  
Wilson's argument has, however, a fundamental flaw, which 
may have already become apparent during my presentation. I noticed 
that (4) is a plausible formulation of principle P2, but only in 
conjunction with formulas like (2) and (3) that allows us to characterize 
B as an effect, i.e., as an event that already appears in regular 
conjunctions with other events that are presented, in preliminary form, 
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as its  possible causes8. Rule 5 is very clear about this: it only applies 
when “several different objects produce the same effect.” But when 
Wilson performs the inversion of quantifiers to obtain formula (5), 
which he takes as symbolizing principle P1, he falls into a deadlock:  
 (i) if he maintains  in (5) the same requirement that B is interpreted as 
an event, he will actually have proved that (5) follows from (4), but all 
that (5) states, in this interpretation, is that every effect has a cause, which 
is undoubtedly true, but only trivially, and not at all a formulation of 
P1.9  
 (ii) If he expands the interpretation of B in (5) to cover any kind of 
event10, then certainly (5) represents a correct version of P1, but it is no 
longer possible to infer it from (4).11  
III  The implication P1 → P2  
It seems safe to say, therefore, that Wilson has not 
demonstrated that P1 follows from P2. But that alone does not mean 
that another demonstration could not be discovered; thus, to 
conclusively resolve the issue, it would be necessary to prove the 
consistency between P2 and the negation of P1. One way to prove, in 
logic, the consistency of two propositions is to provide a model in 
which both are satisfied. I think it is possible to provide such a model 
in this case.  
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The model I propose is a (potentially) infinite sequence formed 
by the letters A, B, C, D, E, in which every A is followed by B, all B is 
preceded by A, and there is no other pair of letters that display the 
same regularity. This sequence can be constructed by the rules:  
R1: ∅ →A  
R2: A → B  
R3: B →{A, C, D, E}  
R4: C →{A, B, D, E}  
R5: D →{A, B, C, E}  
R6: E →{A, B, C, D}  
Rule R3 must be understood as stating that the first occurrence 
of B in the sequence is followed by A, the second by C, and so on, 
returning to A on the fifth occurrence. The other rules work similarly. I 
present below the beginning of the sequence thus constructed:  
ABABCABDABEABABCBDBEBABCDCECABDEDABEABABCB 
Let us now interpret this sequence as representing a series of 
occurrences of events of types A, B, C, D, E, among which we will 
investigate the existence of causal connections. If we adopt the 
criterion that causation involves regular and invariable successions of 
events, only successions AB are here to be classified as connections of 
cause and effect. In this case, our sequence does satisfy P2, for in it the 
same cause has always the same effect, and vice versa. But it does not 
satisfy P1 (or, which is the same, it satisfies the negation of P1), for it 
contains events that are not caused, according to the criterion we 
adopted.  
Here, however, an objection might be raised. There is indeed 
no regularity in the sequences involving the events C, D and E, but why 
should that mean that they are not causes neither effects of the events 
that precede and succeed them? After all, couldn’t we conceive that 
there are causes even though no regularity is displayed? Why not 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil., Campinas, v. 35, n. 1, p. 85-98, jan.-jun. 2012. 
 
JOSÉ OSCAR DE ALMEIDA MARQUES 96 
suppose that, at the beginning of the sequence, B caused A, then 
caused C, then caused D? In this case, the sequence of events 
represented could as well be described as satisfying P1 and not 
satisfying P212. Why should one prefer one interpretation to the other?  
The answer is that we can adopt this interpretation, but at the 
expense of being forced to adopt as well a conception of causes as 
“powers,” “strength” or “influences”, i.e., as an intrinsic property of 
the events themselves, which they possess irrespective their relations 
with other events, and through which they would be able to “produce” 
their effects. This is a respectable and traditional conception of 
causality, characteristic of Cartesian and scholastic philosophy, but is 
also one that Hume, I believe, decisively rejected and devoted himself 
to refute in the Treatise.13
Thus, if we adopt Hume’s conception of causality and 
necessary connection, whose establishment rests entirely on the 
regularity of the successions of events, it is not conceptually possible to 
provide an example where P1 holds but P2 does not. To see this, it is 
enough to consider the “first definition” of cause proposed by Hume in 
the Treatise: “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where 
all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of 
precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter”'14. 
If we introduce now xRy as a relationship that exists between particular 
instances of events x and y whenever x and y are spatiotemporally 
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these causal powers would then have the function of explaining the observable 
regularities, not of dispensing with them. 
14 Treatise, 1.3.14.31. 
 
HUME’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 97 
contiguous and x precedes y, the proposition “A causes B” (A and B 
being undetermined types of events) can be formally defined as:  
(6)  A causes B =def ( x ) [ Ax  ⊃ ( ∃ y ) ( xRy & By )]  
or, more fully, incorporating the second clause of Rule 4 that requires 
regularity also from effects to causes:  
(7)   A causes B =def ( x ) [ Ax ⊃ (∃ y ) ( xRy & By )] &  
( x ) [ Bx ⊃ (∃ y ) ( yRx & Ay )]  
What this shows is that, in a situation in which events of the 
same type were not always followed (in the sense stipulated by the 
relation R) by events of the same type, and, conversely, that events of 
the same type were not always preceded by events of the same type, no 
causal relationship would exist, by definition. Therefore, what follows is that, 
if causal relations were to hold generally between events, this would 
imply the truth of P2 (same causes, same effects and same effects, same 
causes). Now P1 says that every event (of any type) has a cause, thus P1 
(assuming that there are events at all) asserts the general holding of 
causal relations, thus P1 logically implies P2, qed.  
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